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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3, having been referred to that Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Suppression: Did the District Court err in denying the Defense's Motion to Suppress 
evidence found in a bag belonging to Defendant, which was searched without a warrant and without 
consent of the Defendant? 
B. New Counsel for Sentencing: Did the District Court err in denying the Defendant's 
Motion for new counsel prior for sentencing, despite there being a bona fide issue being raised, and 
explored at an evidentiary hearing, as to whether the Defendant had had effective assistance of 
counsel at trial? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Suppression: The District Court's legal conclusions in its ruling on a motion to suppress 
is reviewed de novo. State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App. 1996). 
B. New Counsel for Sentencing: District Court's rulings on motions for new public defense 
defense counsel are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
A. Suppression: The suppression issue was raised by motion. See R. at 72-82. 
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B. New Counsel for Sentencing: The motion for new counsel for sentencing, and the related 
issues of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial were raised to and heard by the Court in a post-trial, 
pre-sentencing evidentiary hearing. See Record at 0374. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Appellant was convicted at jury trial of aggravated arson and sentenced to 5 to life 
in prison. See Judgment, R. at 353-356. 
Prior to trial, the Defense moved the Court to suppress evidence linking the Defendant to the 
arson which was found in a car possessed and driven by the Defendant's son Joseph and his 
girlfriend, Emily. See R. at 72-82, 133-34. The facts, as found by the Court after evidentiary 
hearing on this motion, which findings are not challenged in this appeal - but rather the legal 
conclusions based thereon - included the following: 
At some point . . . a red Kia Sephia pulled into the driveway. The car was bein 
driven by Joseph Gulli In the car with Joseph were his girlfriend, Emily Green, 
and his mother, the defendant. 
At some point, Investigator Hohbein asked Joseph for permission to search 
"his vehicle." Joseph readily agreed . . . Joseph produced keys for the vehicle from 
his pocket and opened the trunk and doors to the car. Joseph expressed no reluctance 
in agreeing to the search and placed no limitations on the search. 
In the rear seat of the car, Investigator Hohbein found a green and cream 
colored canvas bag. He removed it from the car and began to search it when he was 
told by Joseph that the bag belonged to his mother, the defendant. Joseph did not tell 
the investigator that the bag should not be searched. Instead he stood watching as the 
bag was emptied. During the search of the bag, Investigator Hohbein found within 
it a broken Mason jar smelling strongly of gasoline, lint and paper soaked in gasoline 
and an empty book of paper matches. 
R. at 133-135. 
The Court denied the motion to suppress based on the finding that consent had been given 
by Joseph and his girlfriend to search the car, and did not indicate that the bag could not be searched, 
reasoning that the Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag left in her 
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son's car, and that the son's consent justified the search thereof. See R. at 130-31. 
The contents of the bag were introduced at trial and shown to link the Defendant to the arson. 
R. at 387: 224-231. The State's witnesses testified that the arson was carried out by use of gasoline 
as an accellerant, and further that a match found at the scene matched the matches found in the book 
of paper matches found in the bag. R. at 388, pp. 293-94, 304-05. 
After trial, prior to sentencing, the Defendant moved the Court for new counsel, claiming that 
trial counsel had not afforded her effective assistance at trial, and that there were fundamental 
disagreements as to how to handle sentencing. See R. at 391. The District Court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing, at which trial counsel, as well as Defendant testified, and the issue of effective 
assistance of trial counsel were explored. See Record at 0374; see particularly, p. 7, line 17-18 
("The question is, did you get a fair trial? Were you competently represented?"). The Court ruled 
that defendant received effective assistance of trial and thus a fair trial. R. 333-338, see particularly, 
p. 335 ("The evidence presented by the Defendant does not demonstrate that the representation 
provided by Mr. Jackson was ineffective.") The Defendant represented herself at the hearing, and 
cross-examined trial counsel. See R. at p. 0374,333-338. The District Court denied the Defendant's 
motion and ordered that trial counsel would continue as Defendant's counsel at sentencing. See R. 
at p. 333-338. Trial counsel represented the Defendant at sentencing. See R. at 392. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Suppression: A person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in a personal bag 
left in her son's automobile, and the son's consent to search the car does not include the bag, when 
prior to searching its contents, the searching law enforcement officer is told that the bag belongs to 
a person other than the consenting party. 
B. New Counsel for Sentencing: When a defendant has requested a new attorney for 
sentencing, and in connection with that request, has raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and 
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has cross-examines trial counsel in an evidentiary hearing regarding that issue, a conflict of interest 
exists between trial counsel and that defendant, such that the defendant's motion for new counsel 
should be granted for sentencing. 
ARGUMENTS 
A. Suppression 
A person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in a personal bag left in her son's 
automobile, and the son's consent to search the car does not include the bag, when prior to searching 
its contents, the searching law enforcement officer is told that the bag belongs to a person other than 
the consenting party. 
Utah law clearly recognizes a motor vehicle occupant's expectation of privacy in personal 
belongings left in the vehicle. See State v. Bisseger, 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178 (cited in State 
v. Rynhart, 81 P.3d 814, 818) (Utah App. 2003)); see also, United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394, 
1396 (9th Cir. 1986) (passenger had reasonable expectation of privacy in brown paper bag found on 
floorboard of companion's car) (also cited in State v. Rynhart, 81 P.3d 814, 818); Arnold v. 
Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 313,437 S.E.2d 235,237 (1993) (passenger had legitimate expectation 
of privacy in closed plastic shopping bag on floor of car) (also cited in State v. Rynhart, 81 P. 3d 814, 
818). 
The issue is whether the son's consent to search the car covered the search of the bag. In this 
case, the officer was informed upon picking up the bag that it belonged not to the consenting party, 
but to his mother. 
The government bears the burden of proving the effectiveness of a third party's consent in 
justifying a search such as that at issue in this case. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179, 110 
S.Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). The government can fulfill that burden in three ways. 
First, it can show both shared use and joint access and control over the searched item, or in other 
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words, actual authority to consent. See United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,171 n. 7,94 S.Ct. 988,993 n. 7, 39 L.Ed.2d 
242 (1974)). In this case, there was no evidence of shared use, joint access, or joint control over the 
bag in question. Instead, all that was shown was that the third party (the son) indicated to the officer 
that the bag belonged to his mother. Second, the government can show that the owner of the item 
to be searched has expressly authorized a third party to give consent to the search. Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. at 188, 110 S.Ct. at 2801. There was no showing of this, whatsoever. Finally, it may establish 
consent by means of the "apparent authority doctrine" under which a search is valid if the 
government proves that the officers who conducted it reasonably believed that the person from 
whom they obtained consent had the actual authority to grant that consent. Id. Again, there has been 
no such showing. The son's indication that the bag belonged to his mother, and his silence and non-
objection, do not create a reasonable belief that the son had authority to grant consent. 
Accordingly, the search of the bag was not justified by the consent defendant's son's consent 
to search the car, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. 
The evidence from the bag was clearly prejudicial, as it directly linked the defendant to the 
arson. The contents of the bag were introduced at trial and shown to link the Defendant to the arson. 
R. at 387: 224-231. Investigator Hohbein found within it a broken Mason jar smelling strongly of 
gasoline, lint and paper soaked in gasoline and an empty book of paper matches. R. at 133-135. The 
State's witnesses testified that the arson was carried out by use of gasoline as an accellerant, and 
further that a match found at the scene matched the matches found in the book of paper matches 
found in the bag. R. at 388, pp. 293-94, 304-05. 
The case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial without the evidence from the bag. 
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B. New Counsel for Sentencing 
When a defendant has requested a new attorney for sentencing, and in connection with that 
request, has raised ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and has cross-examines trial counsel in an 
evidentiary hearing regarding that issue, a conflict of interest exists between trial counsel and that 
defendant, such that the defendant's motion for new counsel should be granted for sentencing. 
Defendants have the same right to counsel at sentencing as they do at other stages of the 
adjudication of the criminal case brought against them. See State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 176, 178 
(Utah App. 1996); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137, 88 S.Ct. 254, 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). 
A conflict of interest arises between an indigent defendant and public defense counsel when 
an ineffective assistance claim is pursued post-trial, as was the case in the evidentiary hearing which 
occurred prior to sentencing in this case. See, e.g., Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah 
1989) (Utah appellate courts will consider ineffective assistance claim only if new lawyer represents 
defendant/appellate, since it is "unreasonable to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue of his own 
ineffectiveness at trial on direct appeal."). The existence of a conflict of interest in this case, after 
the evidentiary hearing occurred, is particular clear given that in that hearing, the Defendant herself 
actually cross-examined the defense lawyer. 
If an actual conflict is established between the defendant and counsel, failure to substitute 
new counsel is per se error, without a requirement of showing ineffective assistance, with its 
attendant standards, thereafter. See State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah App. 1998). 
Accordingly, it was an abuse of discretion to not appoint new counsel for the Defendant after 
the evidentiary hearing on her claims of ineffective assistance and on her motion for a new lawyer 
for sentencing. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (application of an 
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improper legal standard is necessarily an abuse of discretion). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant is entitled to reversal and remand for new trial based on the District 
Court's error in not suppressing the contents of her bag found searched in the course of the search 
of her son's automobile. 
Defendant/Appellant is entitled to remand for re-sentencing with new counsel. 
Dated this 1 ^ day of OcJA * , 20 Q g 
Randall C. Allen 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, 
AND COMMITMENT 
1 Criminal No. 021500873 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The Defendant, CONNI GULLI, having been found guilty pursuant to a jury trial and by a 
jury of her peers of the offense of AGGRAVATED ARSON, a First-Degree Felony, on October 30, 
2003, and the Court having entered the verdict of guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation 
of a presentence investigation report prior to sentencing, and after said report was prepared and 
presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having been called on for sentencing on January 26, 
2004, in Parowan, Utah, and the Defendant, CONNI GULLI, having appeared before the Court in 
person together with her attorney of record J. Bryan Jackson, and the State of Utah having appeared 
by and through Iron County Attorney Scott Garrett, and the Court having reviewed the presentence 
investigation report and the file in detail, and having further heard statements from all parties and 
% 
FEB i : imk 
i 5th DISTRICT COURT 
1
 "HON COUNTY 
- ^ — _ Deputy ClorK 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and 
Commitment, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, CONNI 
GULLI, has been convicted of the offense of AGGRAVATED ARSON, a First-Degree Felony, and 
the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should 
not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, 
it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Defendant, CONNI 
GULLI, and pursuant to her conviction of AGGRAVATED ARSON, a First-Degree Felony, is 
hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for a period of five (5) years 
to life, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah State Department of 
Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no fine shall be imposed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, CONNI GULLI, shall pay restitution in the 
sum and amount of two hundred fifty-eight thousand five hundred sixty-three dollars and three cents 
($258,563.03). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall be given consideration for credit for 
time served to date. 
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COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, CONNI GULLI, and deliver 
her to the Utah State Department ofCorrections in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined 
in accordance with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this ^ " day of February, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
(jfc*J&> &-V&L 
J. RMJLIP EVES 
DMrict Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron County, 
State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true, and exact copy of the original 
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. Conni Gulli. Criminal 
No. 021500873, now on file and of record m my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah, 
this \~) day of February, 2004. 
( S E A L ) J 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
kiiiL YXOMOK-By:_ 
Deputy District Court Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a full, true, and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND COMMITMENT, on this L ' day of February, 
2004, to J. Bryan Jackson, Attorney for Defendant, at the office of the Iron County Attorney, 97 
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